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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Few contemporary issues of international security are more prominent 
than the dilemma posed by Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear weapon.  
For its part, Iran insists that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful 
purposes.1  Nevertheless, the United Nations, through a number of Security 
Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) actions, has 
found Iran in breach of its responsibilities.2  Israel, along with most of the 
world, is convinced that beyond simply violating IAEA directives, Iran is 
developing nuclear weapons, and Israel is one of the main, if not the main 
target.3 
In a September 2012 speech to the United Nations, Israel’s Prime 
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, voiced “his fear that Iran would use a 
nuclear bomb to eliminate his nation.”4  According to Netanyahu, “[b]y 
next spring, at most by next summer at current enrichment rates, [Iran] will 
have finished the medium enrichment and move on to the final stage” 
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 1. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security 
Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report of the Director, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/55, para 9, (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ 
Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-55.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
 2. Id. §§ A, B, L. 
 3. See generally, Iran's Nuclear Program (Nuclear Talks, 2012), N.Y. TIMES, Updated Nov. 16, 
2012, at A1, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/ 
nuclear_program/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 4. At UN General Debate, Israeli Leader Calls for ‘Red Line’ for Action on Iran’s Nuclear 
Plans, UN NEWS CENTER, Sept. 27, 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 
43088&Cr=general+debate&Cr1= (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).  
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needed to produce a weapon.5  He said that a “red line should be drawn 
right here . . . [b]efore Iran gets to a point where it's a few months away or a 
few weeks away from amassing enough enriched uranium to make a 
nuclear weapon.”6 
The United States (U.S.) has long asserted that it will not tolerate a 
nuclear-armed Iran.  President Obama reiterated in October of 2012 his 
unequivocal declaration that “as long as [he is] president of the United 
States Iran will not get a nuclear weapon.”7  Thus, preventing Iran from 
getting a nuclear weapon appears to be a nonnegotiable cornerstone of the 
President’s policy.  In addition, he points out that Iran has said that it wants 
to “see Israel wiped off the map” and insistes that “if Israel is attacked, 
America will stand with Israel.” 8   
These plain-spoken pronouncements suggest that the President is 
prepared to use any means, including military force, to prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon.  That said, while America will “stand with 
Israel” if it is attacked, it is not clear what precisely the U.S. would do if 
Israel had not been attacked, per se, but nevertheless perceived itself at 
risk—if, for example, Iran reached the enrichment thresholds that Prime 
Minister Netanyahu sees as “red lines.”9  If such red lines are reached, it 
would seem that Israel, if not the U.S. as well, would advance the military 
option even if an actual weapon had not been assembled and deployed. 
Importantly, the President maintains that a nuclear Iran would be not 
just a threat to Israel, but also to U.S. national security.10  But it further 
appears that, at least for now, he is satisfied with pursuing a “policy of 
applying diplomatic pressure and potentially having bilateral discussions 
with the Iranians to end their nuclear program.”11  He also seems optimistic 
about the effectiveness of sanctions, as he has argued that Iran’s economy is 
“in a shambles.”12  He asserts that:   
                                                     
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. 2012 Presidential Debate:  President Obama and Mitt Romney’s remarks at Lynn 
University on Oct. 22, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2012 (transcript) (Remarks of President Barack Obama), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/2012-presidential-debate-president-obama-and-
mitt-romneys-remarks-at-lynn-university-on-oct-22-running-transcript/2012/10/22/be8899d6-1c7a-
11e2-9cd5-b55c38388962_story.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Presidential Debate].  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Presidential Debate, supra note7. 
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[The administration] organized the strongest coalition and the 
strongest sanctions against Iran in history, and it is crippling their 
economy.  Their currency has dropped 80 percent.  Their oil 
production has plunged to the lowest level since they were 
fighting a war with Iraq 20 years ago.  So their economy is in a 
shambles.13 
While sanctions have certainly harmed the Iranian economy,14 
implementing truly draconian restrictions has proven difficult, as many 
countries are dependent upon Iranian oil.  Accordingly, the U.S. was 
recently obliged to renew waivers for Iran’s top oil buyers,15 even as Iran 
continued to defy international mandates.  If sanctions fail, and the “red 
lines” are crossed, the question then arises, what would be the legal basis 
for taking military action? 
Since the establishment of the United Nations, member countries have 
agreed to forgo the use of force, or threat of the use of force, against 
another state.16  There are two exceptions to this prohibition:  1) if the 
Security Council authorizes military force under Chapter VII of the 
Charter;17 or 2) if necessary as an act of self-defense.18   
As to the Security Council option, it is very unlikely any resolution 
authorizing a use of force against Iran for the development of a nuclear 
weapon will be forthcoming.  For example, Russian foreign minister Sergei 
Lavrov indicated to reporters in late October 2012 that Russia will block 
                                                     
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Farnaz Fassihi and Jay Solomon, In Iran’s Factories and Shops, Tighter 
Sanctions Exact Toll, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 3, 2013, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578120250597512768.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2013).   
 15. Timothy Gardner & Roberta Rampton, U.S. Extends Waivers on Iran Sanctions to India, 
China, REUTERS, Dec. 7, 2012, available at  http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/07/us-usa-iran-
sanctons-idUSBRE8B615M20121207 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).  
 16. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 provides:  “Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  
 17. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 42, which provides: 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.  Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
 18. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Smith & John B. Bellinger III, Providing a Legal Basis to Attack Iran, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2012), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-
27/opinions/35497254_1_military-force-president-obama-iran (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
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any resolution that “could be interpreted as authorizing military action 
against Iran.”19  In addition, many observers believe that China would also 
likely exercise a veto against military action.20 
As a result. any military action that might be taken against Iran would 
have to be justified under a theory of self-defense.  Article 51 of the UN 
Charter provides that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security.  Measures taken by Members in the exercise 
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter 
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.21   
The obvious problem here is that the Charter seems to require not just 
the crossing of some “red line” or even the acquisition of a nuclear weapon, 
but rather an “armed attack.”  While Israel has not been the victim of a 
nuclear attack, at least one commentator insists that Israel has, indeed, been 
the victim of an “armed attack” attributable to Iran.   
Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School, argues that Israel 
already has the legal right to attack Iran by claiming that Iran directed the 
1992 attack on Israel’s embassy in Argentina, as well as alleging that more 
recently, Iran was supplying weapons to Hamas.22  According to 
Dershowitz, the “law of war does not require an immediate military 
response to an armed attack,” and adds, “[t]he nation attacked can postpone 
its counterattack without waiving its right.”23 
Professor Dershowitz’s argument is not sustainable as a matter of 
international law.  In the 1986 Nicaragua case, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) found that the provision of arms to nonstate actors did not 
amount to an “armed attack” against the victim nation, and also concluded 
                                                     
 19. Russia to Veto any UN Motion on Iran, NOVINITE.COM (Oct. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=144421 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).  
 20. Smith, supra note 18.  
 21. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 22. Alan Dershowitz, Israel Has the Right to Attack Iran’s Nuclear Reactors Now, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 16, 2011) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz/israel-
has-the-right-to-a_b_836764.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).  
 23. Id. 
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that even certain kinds of armed clashes (“frontier incidents”) did not 
qualify either.24   
In addition, the ICJ made it clear that necessity and proportionality 
were essential elements to the exercise of lawful self-defense.  
Notwithstanding Professor Dershowitz’s claims to the contrary, there is 
utterly no authority or precedent for the notion that resurrecting a more than 
twenty-year-old incident involving an embassy attack would sustain a 
finding of the requisite “necessity” to support a self-defense strike on major 
nuclear facilities.   
Dershowitiz offers another rationale.  He argues that Iran has “publicly 
declared war on Israel by calling for it ‘to be wiped off the map.’”25  
Among the problems with this argument is the simple fact that not even the 
most bellicose of officials in both Israel and Iran are contending that a state 
of war exists between the nations, notwithstanding the hostility of the 
rhetoric.  Thus, neither the self-defense nor the state of war theory espoused 
by Professor Dershowitz is sufficiently supported by the facts.   
Another legal academic, Anthony D’Amato of Northwestern 
University, takes a somewhat different tack in arguing the legality of a 
military operation against Iran.26  He says that if Iran is constructing nuclear 
weapons, it is “enough” for him that “Iran says it wants to push the Israelis 
into the sea.”27  Under those circumstances, he contends, “it can hardly be 
said” that Israel and the U.S. would be violating international law if they 
took the “initiative to block” Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear device.  
According to D’Amato: 
[Action against Iran] can only be preserving international law for 
future generations . . . .  In order to preserve international law we 
have to defend it once in a while.  I think we have to defend it 
against rogue states or states that have expressed hostile 
intentions, like Iran and like North Korea.  The only reasonable 
                                                     
 24. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 
1986 ICJ REP. 14, 94, (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5 (Last visited Feb. 
23 2013).  
 25. Experts Mull Legality of Strike on Iran, WORLD NEWS, (Feb. 23, 2013) available at 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2012/04/12/Experts-mull-legality-of-strike-on-Iran/UPI-
79071334277960/ (Last visited Feb. 23 2013). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  
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thing to do is to take those weapons out.  Remove that threat and 
the world is going to be safer.28 
Little in Professor D’Amato’s approach aligns with existing 
understandings of use of force law in the post-UN Charter era.  Instead, he 
appears to embrace the concept of “illegal but justified” to legitimize an 
attack on Iran.  Generally speaking, the “illegal but justified” concept has 
been raised in the past, especially in the context of humanitarian 
interventions.  However, Professor Anthea Roberts of the London School of 
Economics points out that even in the often sympathetic setting of a 
humanitarian crisis, the concept “is ultimately not a sustainable position in 
international law [because] it will come to be recognized as an exception to 
the prohibition on the use of force.”29  Such concerns are warranted, as she 
explains: 
The “illegal but justified” approach also shifts the focus away 
from questions of legality and towards questions of legitimacy.  
Attempting to completely divorce legality and legitimacy can 
ossify the law and undermine its relevance, which increases the 
risk of self-serving exceptionalism.  Relying on legitimacy as an 
independent justification for action is also problematic because 
legitimacy is underdefined and open to manipulation by powerful 
actors.30 
Consequently, advocates of the use of force against Iran must assess 
the appropriateness of such a course of action not based on the “illegal but 
justified” theory, but rather within the context of the anticipatory self-
defense doctrine. 
II.  ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE 
What exactly is meant by anticipatory self-defense?  In answering that 
vital question, it may be helpful to understand what the term does not mean.  
Professor Sean Murphy reminds us that anticipatory self-defense is not the 
                                                     
 28. Id. 
 29. Anthea Roberts, Legality vs Legitimacy:  Can Uses of Force be Illegal but Justified?, in 
HUMAN RIGHT, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 212 (P. Alston, E. Macdonald, eds., Oxford 
University Press, 2008), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1518290 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2013).  
 30. Id. 
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same as preemptive self-defense.31  He points out that anticipatory self-
defense “refers to the use of armed coercion by a state to halt an imminent 
act of armed coercion by another state (or non-state actor operating from 
that other state).”32  Preemptive self-defense, he tells us, is different:   
Preemptive self-defense is used to refer to the use of armed 
coercion by a state to prevent another state (or non-state actor) 
from pursuing a particular course of action which is not yet 
directly threatening, but which, if permitted to continue, could 
result at some future point in an act of armed coercion against the 
first state.33 
Action constituting preemptive self-defense so defined requires a 
Security Council resolution.  The anticipatory self-defense doctrine can, 
however, justify unilateral action.  Authority for anticipatory self-defense is 
not literally set forth in the text of the U.N. Charter.  Indeed, because of the 
absence of an explicit textual endorsement of anticipatory self-defense, 
many experts do not accept its legitimacy.34 
However, as noted above, Article 51 does provide in relevant part that 
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence . . . .”35  Among those that do believe 
in the legality of anticipatory self-defense, they usually argue it is derived 
from Article 51’s reference to the “inherent” right of self-defense.   
Where is this “inherent” right sourced?  Most scholars point to the 
1837 Caroline incident as the most important event admitting the 
doctrine.36  The Caroline was a boat used to transport supplies to Canadian 
rebels.  Despite her being moored in U.S. territory, British forces entered 
the U.S., boarded the vessel, killed an American crewman, set the ship on 
fire, and sent it over Niagara Falls.  In the ensuing diplomatic uproar, the 
British claimed their action was justified in self-defense.  Daniel Webster, 
then Secretary of State, addressed this claim in a response to the British 
Ambassador.   
                                                     
 31. Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699, 703‒04 (2005), 
http://lsgs.georgetown.edu/programs/nlp/preventivewar/Villanova%20Preemption%20Article%20Final.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 703.  
 33. Id. at 704. 
 34. See, e.g., SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, ANTHONY JOHN BILLINGSLEY, & CHRISTOPHER 
MICHAELSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 136 (2010) (referencing the “doubtful 
status of the legality of anticipatory self-defense”). 
 35. U.N. Charter, at art. 51 (emphasis added) 
 36. KINGA TIBORI-SZABO, ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE 72‒75 (2011). 
326   ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 19:2 
 
Webster conceded that a “just right of self-defense attaches always to 
nations as well as to individuals, and is equally necessary for the 
preservation of both.”  When “clear and absolute necessity” warrants it a 
state, Webster contends, can use force in self-defense.  Moreover, Webster's 
further articulation that the necessity for self-defense must be “instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation” has come to define the prerequisites for anticipatory self-
defense.37 
Although some authorities nevertheless continue to claim that “the 
dominant view amongst states and international lawyers is that anticipatory 
self-defense is not permissible under international law,”38 it is difficult to 
find any state that unequivocally and publicly asserts that it knowingly will 
forego the opportunity to use force to avert the blow of an armed attack it 
knows it will imminently and inevitably receive.  It may be such blunt 
reality that prompted the Secretary General of the United Nations to declare 
in a 2005 report: 
Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which 
safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend 
themselves against armed attack.  Lawyers have long recognized 
that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already 
happened.39 
For its part, the U.S. State Department cited this statement and said 
“the United States welcomed the report’s . . . recognition of a right of 
anticipatory self-defense in appropriate circumstances.”40  As a result, 
whatever theories or objections academics and others may have, it appears 
now that most states (albeit not without dispute) accept the legitimacy of 
anticipatory self-defense. 
                                                     
 37. Id. at 75 (sourcing Daniel Webster quotes). 
 38. See, e.g., James Mulcahy and Charles O. Mahony, Anticipatory Self-Defense:  A 
Discussion of the International Law, 2 HANSE L. REV. 231, 233 (2006), available at 
http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf4/Vol2No2Art06.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).  
 39. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom:  Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights For All, ¶ 124, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).  
 40. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE 
YEAR 2006, PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS, Part 5, at 138 (2006). 
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III.  THE QUESTION OF IMMINENCE 
The difficulty in applying anticipatory self-defense is determining 
exactly what “imminent” means, and whether reasonably reliable facts exist 
in a particular situation to support an imminence finding.  The U.S. has long 
taken a somewhat aggressive interpretation as to this prerequisite of a fully 
justified act of anticipatory self-defense.  In the 2005 version of the U.S.’s 
official Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE),41 for example, U.S. forces 
are permitted to take action in self-defense not only when victimized by a 
hostile act, but also when faced with “hostile intent.”42  Hostile intent is 
defined as:   
The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, 
U.S. forces or other designated persons or property.  It also 
includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission 
and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. 
personnel or vital USG property.43  
In turn, “imminent use of force” is defined rather expansively.  
Specifically, the SROE states:   
g. Imminent Use of Force.  The determination of whether the use 
of force against U.S. forces is imminent will be based on an 
assessment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at 
the time and may be made at any level.  Imminent does not 
necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.44  
                                                     
 41. U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK ch. 5, app. A (2012) [hereinafter 
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK] (republished from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, No. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of 
Engagement(SORE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (2005)). 
 42. Id. at ¶ 6b(1).  The SROE states: 
Self-Defense.  Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to 
exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile 
intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as detailed below, military 
members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or 
demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a 
unit, individual self-defense should be considered a subset of unit self-defense. As 
such, unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of their 
unit. Both unit and individual self-defense includes defense of other U.S. Military 
forces in the vicinity.  
 43. Id. at ¶ 3f. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 3g. 
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Nevertheless, although arguably the U.S. is already more flexible on 
the temporal requirement of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine than 
other nations, it is possible that it is evolving towards an even more 
expansive reading.  In a 2011 speech, John O. Brennan, Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, discussed the 
greater flexibility with respect to the imminence requirement in the context 
of terrorist threats:   
We are finding increasing recognition in the international 
community that a more flexible understanding of “imminence” 
may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups . . . .  Over 
time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism 
partners have begun to recognize that the traditional conception 
of what constitutes an “imminent” attack should be broadened in 
light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and 
technological innovations of terrorist organizations.45 
Mr. Brennan’s reference to “modern-day capabilities, techniques, and 
technological innovations” is significant in the context of the terrible 
potential of nuclear weapons.  It is certainly true that these weapons have 
enjoyed something of a special status in international law.  William 
Boothby points out in his treatise Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict 
that their use is not governed by the Protocols to the Geneva Conventions46 
that otherwise comprehensively regulate the means and methods of war.47  
Indeed, Boothby notes that other than the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, no treaty “either prohibits or restricts the development, 
stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of such weapons, or threats to use 
them.”48 
In its 1996 case about nuclear weapons, the ICJ also seemed to accord 
them special status.  In a lengthy opinion  the ICJ generally lambasts the 
weapons, and concludes that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would 
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed 
                                                     
 45. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, 
Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security:  Strengthening Our Security by 
Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sep. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
 46. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12, 1949, AND 
RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I), art. 
57, ¶ 2(b), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).  Although the U.S. is not a 
party to Protocol I, parts of it are considered customary international law. 
 47. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 215‒20 (2009). 
 48. Id. at 220. 
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conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”49  
Yet, the ICJ concedes that the “Court cannot conclude definitively whether 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an 
extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a state 
would be at stake.”50 
All of this seems to suggest that the world community recognizes that 
these weapons are distinctive, and that special considerations apply to them.  
This might suggest that given their unique potential to put the “very 
survival of the state” at risk, more flexibility as to the meaning of 
“imminence” might be applicable where they constitute an existential threat 
to the target state.  As the experience of the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
militaries during the Cold War amply demonstrates, these weapons can be 
mated to delivery platforms such as missile systems that are capable of 
being launched on very short notice.  Once launched, it can be extremely 
difficult or impossible to defend against them.51 
At the same time it must be recalled that there is “no rule in general 
international law which prohibits a State from developing and/or possessing 
nuclear weapons, per se.”52  Moreover, as a matter of international law, it 
appears that a nuclear weapons program at its very nascent stage does not 
qualify as an “imminent” threat, even when it may be plain that the 
developing state may very well intend to use the weapons against another 
state.53  This is one reason why Israel’s 1981 attack against Iraq’s Osirak 
reactor as it was nearing operational status earned universal 
condemnation—to include that of the United States—in U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 48754 despite assertions of self-defense by Israel.55 
                                                     
 49. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996, I.C.J. 226 
(July 8, 1996).   
 50. Id; see also BOOTHBY, supra note 477, at 221. 
 51. However, the U.S. and Israel conduct an annual exercise aimed at countering the threat of 
ballistic missiles.  See Jim Garamone, U.S. Partners with Israel for Exercise Austere Challenge, AMERICAN 
FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118239 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
 52. TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51OF THE UN CHARTER 359 (2010). 
 53. Some take a different perspective.  One author points out that in a 1981 Congressional 
hearing concerning the Osirak raid Professor John Norton Moore “noted that the effort to strike the 
reactor before it went critical must also be taken into consideration and, even if were two to five years 
before the Iraqis could product a bomb:  ‘Then I think that the action might well be legal.’”  Lt. Col. Uri 
Shoham, The Israeli Aerial Raid Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Right of Self-Defense, 109 
MIL. L. REV. 191, 222 (1985) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
 54. S.C. Res. 487, ¶ 36 U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg, UN Doc. S/RES/487 (1981).   
 55. See Shoham, supra note 53. 
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In any event, the best publicly available estimates seem to suggest that 
Iran would have enough enriched uranium to produce enough “fissile 
material for 2 nuclear weapons by late 2013 or early 2014.”56  Of course, 
merely possessing a nuclear weapon is only part of the process, as there 
must be a delivery platform.  In that regard, Iran’s ballistic missile program 
may be able to produce a medium-range missile capable of striking Israel, 
although an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the U.S. 
seems to be some years distant.57 
Importantly, however, the mere possession of nuclear weapons and the 
means of delivering them is not, in any event, alone sufficient to justify an 
act of anticipatory self-defense, even taking into account the gravity of the 
nuclear threat.  While the facts need not necessarily show that an attack is 
actually under way as some have argued,58 and the threat need not be 
“immediate or instantaneous,” the evidence still must show something more 
than capability and deep animosity before an attack based on anticipatory 
self-defense could be legally justified.  One need only reference the Cold 
War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to appreciate that such conduct 
can exist for literally decades without an attack occurring.   
Discerning the Iranian calculus about the actual use of a nuclear 
device, especially in the face of official denials of any intent to acquire the 
weapons, is difficult.  Still, there is no reason to assume Iran will fail to take 
into account Israel’s military capabilities in the decision-making process.  
This is especially so when experts estimate that with “80 or 90” nuclear 
weapons—along with the missiles, planes, and submarines to deliver 
them—Israel has an overwhelming advantage in terms of its nuclear 
capability.59  Quite obviously, for the foreseeable future Israel would be 
able to deliver a crushing retaliatory blow in the event the Iranians chose to 
use the one or two weapons it is believed they might be able to acquire by 
2014.  Even rogue regimes that possess nuclear weapons recognize the risk 
to their existence posed by powers with a vastly superior arsenal, and 
exercise restraint accordingly.60  In short, the required element of 
                                                     
56. Maseh Zarif, The Iranian Nuclear Program:  Timelines, Data, and Estimates V5.0, AEI 
IranTracker, Nov. 23, 2012, available at http://www.irantracker.org/nuclear-program/zarif-timelines-
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 57. See generally, STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SEV., R42849, IRAN’S BALLISTIC 
MISSILE AND SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAMS (2012). 
 58. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 190‒92 (4th ed. 
2005) (discussing “interceptive self-defense”). 
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imminence to support the necessity for an anticipatory self-defense attack 
does not appear to currently exist. 
IV.  ANTICIPATORY COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
Even if one is among those who accept the legitimacy of anticipatory 
self-defense, and also further believes that sufficient facts exist to support 
an imminent threat to Israel, there is nevertheless the additional question as 
to whether anticipatory collective self-defense is extant in international law.  
In other words, to what extent can America “stand with Israel” where the 
threat of Iranian attack does not directly imperil the U.S.?  Again, the text 
of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides no specific authority.  Rather, it 
confines collective self-defense to circumstances where an armed attack has 
already occurred.  Accordingly, if anticipatory collective self-defense exists 
at all, it must—like anticipatory self-defense itself—be contained within the 
“inherent” concept of self-defense. 
Professor George Walker argues forcefully that it does.61  In his 
seminal 1998 article, Walker asserts that the “concept of anticipatory 
collective self-defense has existed for nearly two centuries, including the 
fifty years during which the Charter has been in force, and this form of joint 
response by states appears to have attained the status of a customary 
norm.”62  Indeed, Walker contends that the self-defense right the U.N. 
Charter negotiators intended as “inherent” in Article 51 “included a right to 
anticipatory collective self-defense.”63 
Most scholars who accept the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense 
seem to agree.  For example, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
of Cyber Warfare,64 a document produced by an international group of 
experts, explicitly provides for both anticipatory self-defense65 and 
collective self-defense.66  Regarding collective anticipatory self-defense, the 
commentary to Rule 16 provides:  “Both the victim-State and the State 
providing assistance must be satisfied that there is an imminent (Rule 15) or 
on-going armed attack.”67  In short, a non-victim state may provide 
                                                     
 61. See generally George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era:  
What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321 (1998). 
 62. Id. at 324–25. 
 63. Id. at 351–52. 
 64. NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, THE TALLINN MANUAL 
ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CYBER WARFARE, (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2012), available at 
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 65. Id. at Rule 15. 
 66. Id. at Rule 16. 
 67. Id. (emphasis added). 
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assistance to a victim as long as an attack is imminent—a clear 
endorsement, it seems, of collective anticipatory self-defense.   
More broadly, Dr. Kinga Tibori-Szabo, author of the recent treatise 
Anticipatory Action in Self-Defense, opines:   
[T]here is no (modern-time) instance of state practice for 
collective anticipatory self-defense, so we cannot talk about an 
explicit "customary right" to collective anticipatory self-defense.  
That does not mean, however, that there could not be a lawful 
exercise of such a right.  Customary law acknowledges collective 
self-defense as well as anticipatory self-defense . . . .  The 
collective nature of the anticipatory action should not bear on its 
legality.68 
Additionally, Mr. Hays Parks, one of the world’s leading law of armed 
conflict experts, likewise concludes that a right of collective anticipatory 
self-defense exists in international law, and points to the U.S. Standing 
Rules of Engagement as an expression of that view.69  Those rules provide:   
Collective Self-Defense.  Defense of designated non-U.S. 
military forces and/or designated foreign nationals and their 
property from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.  Only 
the President or SecDef may authorize collective self-defense.70 
                                                     
 68. E-mail from Dr. Kinga Tibori-Szabo to Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Professor of Law Duke 
University School of Law (Sept. 26, 2012, 3:36 PM EST) (on file with author).  Dr. Tibori-Szabo’s full 
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defense as well as anticipatory self-defense.  
According to the majority opinion, collective self-defense, as such, only requires 
an armed attack against one state.  If other states wish to aid the attacked state in 
exercising self-defense, they can do so, as long as the attacked state agrees. 
The same reasoning should apply in case of anticipatory self-defense.  If a state 
considers, on the basis of the available information (interpreted in good faith) that 
it is the object of an imminent attack, it could use its window of opportunity to 
request help from its allies.  
The legality of such an endeavour would thus depend on meeting the 
requirements of anticipatory self-defense by the state that feels in danger. The 
collective nature of the anticipatory action should not bear on its legality. 
 69. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at ch. 5 app. A.  
 70. Id. ¶ 3c (emphasis added). 
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Thus, from the American perspective, U.S. forces can act in collective 
anticipatory self-defense if the designated foreign entity faces demonstrated 
hostile intent, and the President or the Secretary of Defense authorizes it.   
Still, some scholars disagree, and not just those who believe that 
anticipatory self-defense does not exist at all in the post-Charter era.  
Professor Scott Silliman of Duke Law School, maintains that while an 
inherent right to anticipatory self-defense can be fairly read into Article 51, 
collective anticipatory self-defense cannot.71  Because the Caroline case, 
the formative event of the concept of anticipatory self-defense, did not have 
a collective element, it cannot be said, he maintains, that there is any 
inherent right to collective anticipatory self-defense.72 
V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
As this brief examination illustrates, there do not yet appear to be 
adequate facts to support the legality of a strike on Iran, either from 
constructs that allege that an armed attack against Israel has already 
occurred, or from the perspective of anticipatory self-defense.  An even 
more puzzling question is what legal authority President Obama would rely 
upon to authorize a strike against Iranian facilities in the event Iran acquired 
a nuclear weapon (or was about to do so), yet did not act in a manner that 
demonstrated intent to actually launch an attack.  Again, the mere 
possession of a weapon is not, ipso facto, violative of international law in a 
way that would authorize the use of force.   
Additionally, though beyond the scope of this essay, it is relevant to 
note that many—if not most—authorities question whether a use of force 
that complies with the dictates of anticipatory self-defense law—that is, it is 
proportionate and discriminate—would have anything more than a “limited 
chance of operational success.”73  Yet it is also true that airstrikes, for 
example, do appear to have something of a record of success.  In his book 
about the Iraq War, Thomas Ricks reports that experts believe that the 
U.S.’s 1998 airstrikes against Iraq’s weapon’s development facilities 
effectively ended their ambition to acquire nuclear arms.74  
Regardless, if force is eventually used, it will be vitally important for 
the U.S. and Israel to have not only firm legal grounds conceptually, but 
also a clear, publicly disclosable set of supporting facts.  Given the 
terrifying potential of nuclear weapons, Israel’s tragic history of the 
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Holocaust, as well as Iran’s inflammatory—and profoundly unwise—
pronouncements challenging Israel’s right to exist, the world may be ready 
to accept an aggressive interpretation of what constitutes an imminent threat 
of an actual attack, but the absence of any such evidence would likely be 
found unacceptable.   
In a world in which the spread of technology permits a growing 
number of nations to wreak terrible destruction on an opponent, it is more 
important than ever to insist upon observance of the law, especially when 
doing so is the best hope of preventing the unnecessary use of force and all 
the unintended consequences it can entail.75  It is not in either Israel’s or the 
United States’ interest to take any actions that would undermine the rule of 
law.  To date, the legal case justifying a strike has yet to be made. 
 
 
                                                     
 75. See, e.g., Zbigniew Brzezinski, Iran Should Be Key Topic at Hearings, WASH. POST, Jan. 
3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zbigniew-brzezinski-iran-should-be-key-topic-at-
senate-hearings/2013/01/03/5dbc3324-5519-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc_story.html.  Brzezinski writes 
that “five potential implications for the United States of an additional and self-generated war deserve 
close scrutiny”:  
How effective are U.S. military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities likely to 
be, with consequences of what endurance and at what human cost to the Iranian 
people?  
What might be Iran’s retaliatory responses against U.S. interests, and with what 
consequences for regional stability? How damaging could resulting instability be 
to European and Asian economies? 
Could a U.S. attack be justified as in keeping with international standards, and 
would the U.N. Security Council—particularly China and Russia, given their veto 
power—be likely to endorse it ?  
Since Israel is considered to have more than 100 nuclear weapons, how credible is 
the argument that Iran might attack Israel without first itself acquiring a 
significant nuclear arsenal, including a survivable second-strike capability, a 
prospect that is at least some years away?  
Could some alternative U.S. strategic commitment provide a more enduring and 
less reckless arrangement for neutralizing the potential Iranian nuclear threat than 
a unilateral initiation of war in a combustible regional setting? 
